Increases in the securitization and syndication of credit have led to a growing distance between borrowers and the ultimate lenders. As trends continue to encourage the efficient packaging and sale of loans, it has become important for lead lenders to convince fellow syndicate banks of the risk profile of the credit as quickly and effectively as possible.
INTRODUCTION
Among the many consequences of the gradual weakening and eventual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act has been the surge in capital market participation in traditional lending. Banks, which at one time would have held on to loans made to corporate clients now routinely divide them among large syndicates and securitize them into packages sold to investors. With few exceptions, this is undoubtedly a beneficial process for the economy. The large-scale spreading of risks brings the benefits of diversification, reducing volatility to all participants.
However, it also places a new challenge before banks. The bank with which a firm has an existing relationship is most likely to understand the nuances and subtle details involved in the borrower's business. This unique understanding facilitates lending because the bank has better information about the underlying credit. In a world in which credit is quickly becoming commoditized, however, the bank's informational advantage is often diminished. When banks turn around and sell off large portions of the credit, those pieces are often sold to investors who may not enjoy the same level of understanding of the firm's risks. One challenge for banks, then, is to find a means for quickly, clearly, and efficiently communicating this understanding to their fellow syndicate members, or to those investors securitizing the bank's interest.
Traditionally, the analysis of uncertainty in corporate finance has focused on "scenario analysis" or "best case-base case-worst case" (BBW) studies. Instead, in this article, we outline a framework that uses Monte Carlo simulation to improve 1 understanding of uncertainty in firm values. In highly uncertain environments, BBW analysis does not provide sufficient resolution to inform decision makers properly about risks. This is almost always a consequence of its inattention to the probabilistic nature of risk. In contrast, simulation analysis makes explicit risk's probabilistic nature.
In this article, we will begin by examining some of the potential problems with BBW analysis and the advantages of simulation analysis. Then, by way of an example, we will illustrate the simulation approach for two application environments: (i) capital structure decision-making for a credit-worthy firm, with management/equity in control, and (ii) capital structure decision-making for a firm in financial distress or restructuring, with lenders/debt in control. The different objectives of the controlling stakeholders in each of these cases highlight the important role uncertainty plays in any analysis of firm valuations, whether those efforts are directed at maximizing (equity in control) or preserving (debt in control) firm values. In each case, the simulation approach we outline here provides important insights into risks and opportunities not captured by the BBW or scenario approaches. These insights include estimation of default probabilities, determination of reserve account levels and/or operating limitations, initial design of appropriate capital structures, and how best to restructure a project's capital in the event of financial distress.
SCENARIO ANALYSIS VS SIMULATION AS A TOOL FOR RISK ANALYSIS
Scenario/BBW analysis begins with noble-enough motives. Recognizing that uncertainty exists, analysts sought to capture the range of possible outcomes in a simple, tractable manner. Although specific approaches may vary, in general the "base case" corresponds to the assumed most likely outcome.
1 Whether the best and worst case outcomes actually refer to "nirvana" and "end-of-the-world" outcomes, or merely "good"
and "bad" states often depends on the analyst. In any case, however, rarely are there specific probabilities assigned to these scenarios (e.g., what is the probability of the base case occurring?). In those cases for which probabilities are assigned, they are typically assigned (subjectively) to the scenarios themselves, rather than letting them emerge "bottom up" from the fundamental uncertainties involved (prices, costs, sales quantities,
etc.).
Let us, at the outset, illustrate a key drawback of the BBW approach.
Characterizing a project with uncertain cash flows by only three points is insufficient; an infinite number of possible cash flow risk scenarios exist that satisfy any three chosen points. Figure 1 illustrates this principle using three representative probability distributions of project values. Suppose, for this example, that the best, base, and worstcase scenarios correspond to the maximum, median, and minimum realizations of the distribution of project values. There are an infinite number of possible distributional shapes that also include those same three points! More importantly, there is an enormous range in the consequences of the various distributional shapes. In comparing Case 1 and Case 3, Case 3 is more than ninety times as likely to result in a below-zero outcome as Case 1 despite having identical best case, base case, and worst case points. These profound differences in risk are invisible to BBW analysis. The result is a clear misrepresentation of the risks faced by project investors and lenders. Having an 3 understanding of the entire distribution of possible outcomes is critically important and easily provided by simulation analysis.
[ Figure 1 here]
In spite of its weaknesses, the BBW approach has been popular for two main reasons: salience and cost-effectiveness. The salience argument is simply that many project decisions were sufficiently clear-cut that sophisticated risk analysis was perceived as unnecessary -projects were not exposed to significant risks or the risks had been dealt 
A SIMPLE VALUATION EXAMPLE
In order to facilitate our discussion, we will use the following simple example.
Consider a firm that manufactures a commodity product. As a result, it incurs a fixed cost and also an uncertain unit cost. In return, it receives a fixed contract price for the sale of the commodity. 4 We will assume for simplicity that the firm has one year of operation remaining, and we will assume away taxes, transaction costs, and so forth [ Table 1 ].
Because this is the final year of the firm, we shall refer to the profit as the terminal payout. Suppose we were to finance this project with a combination of debt and equity.
Specifically, we will capitalize the project with $1 million, of which 60% consists of debt with a cost of and the remainder is equity with a cost of
[ Table 1 here]
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At this point, we must comment briefly on the classic Modigliani and Miller [1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961 ] results on the irrelevance of capital structure. We are making no claims that simulation will determine the "optimal" capital structure for a project in a strict economic sense. Our focus is on communicating how operating risks to the firm can impact its various claimants -regardless of the capital structure employed (and regardless of its optimality). That said, the simulation methodology employed here generates information useful to the pricing of various claims, and therefore may be of use in determining which forms of financing are expensive or inexpensive relative to the market, and may be considered "optimal" by specific classes of stakeholders.
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UNCERTAINTY IN FIRM VALUE: MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING
When the value of the firm's future cash flows is known with certainty, capital structure issues become essentially irrelevant. For example, in Figure 2 , the probability of realizing any terminal payout up to $1.108 million is certain. In such a case, one might pursue 100% debt financing, since there is no risk of default. 6 Further, without a risk of default, the cost of such financing might be expected to be the riskless rate. Of course, the idea of a truly riskless stream of future cash flows is generally relegated to classroom examples.
[ Figure 2 here] 7
The intended role of equity is to bear some of the risk in the project in return for a greater expected profit. To illustrate this distinction, we will include both senior debt (very low default probability) and equity (moderate "default" probability). Of course, uncertainty works in both directions; equity owners (unlike debt claimants) also benefit from deviations in the firm's value above the average.
To explore these possibilities, let us begin to model the uncertainties in the firm's operations. We shall assume that the firm's unit costs are uncertain and follow a bellshaped distribution (technically, a truncated normal distribution with a mean of $13.92
and a standard deviation of $2.00). Here, this characterization is simple and hypothetical, but in practice the distributional form could be estimated from historical data, based on a market study, or subjectively determined by analysts.
As a result of this assumption, we are left with the distribution in Figure 3 of the unit operating margin (unit price less unit cost) earned by the firm, which reflects the underlying uncertainty. Together with the firm's fixed costs, the variable operating margin is what determines the free cash flow (and thus NPV) of the project.
Consequently, the NPV also reflects that uncertainty. The resulting distribution of net present values (assuming a weighted average cost of capital of 10.8%) in Figure 4 stands in marked contrast to Figure 2 , where there was no uncertainty. 7 Instead, although the expected NPV equals initial capital at $1 million, actual realized NPV ranges from less than half that amount to over $1.5 million. We can also assess the likelihood of obtaining any outcome. For example, there is a 13.4% probability that the realized NPV will be less than $0.8 million.
[ Figure 3 here]
[ Figure 4 here]
Onto this distribution of capital values, let us now superimpose our capital structure. As one would expect, the different levels of priority implicit in the debt and equity commitments will be manifest in the resulting distribution of uncertain cash flows. however, that the equity holders suffer a loss (-18.71%) because the value of the firm net of debt is less than their initial equity investment.
[ Table 2 here]
It is important to be clear about what the results in Table 2 [ Figure 5 here]
Let us now redisplay Figure 4 with our capital structure superimposed (and using terminal payout in place of net present value). Figure 5 illustrates how the uncertain future capital of the firm will be distributed. It becomes clear in Figure 5 that the equity is exposed to much greater risk than debt, as one would expect. In fact, we can precisely describe this risk by breaking apart the composite firm distribution of values into its distinct debt and equity components. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate the payoff probability profiles of the debt and equity components, clearly illustrating the different risk profiles.
[ Figure 6a here]
[ Figure 6b here]
It is here where we can clearly begin to see the advantage of using simulation to understand firm risks. Unlike conventional BBW analyses, simulation highlights the interplay between risk and value along a continuum, providing far greater information concerning the likelihoods of various possible outcomes. This information is contained graphically in the "slope" of the payoff probability profile. The steepness of this slope
indicates the uncertainty present in the firm's value. For example, Figure 7 compares two different profiles. The profile on the top has a very steep slope, reflecting a low degree of uncertainty in the firm's value. In contrast, the profile on the bottom has a comparatively flat (less steep) slope, reflecting a high degree of uncertainty in the firm's value.
Statistically, this "slope" reflects the variance of the underlying distribution.
[ Figure 7 here]
The additional information about risk provided by simulation analysis is not merely an academic exercise. Project objectives and values are influenced directly by the controlling stakeholder class's attitude toward risk. For equity, risk represents opportunity and should be embraced; for debt, it is instead the potential for loss and should be avoided. These attitudes do not change, but depending on which stakeholder class is in control (i.e., whether or not the firm is placed under creditor control), one or the other of these approaches will govern firm behavior. Among other influences, this can often cause abrupt changes in firm values during periods of financial distress -changes that simulation analysis is uniquely suited to address.
For this section, we shall assume that our firm is under normal operation, with equity/management in control and the objective being to maximize the expected value of the equity. We will assume that one of two changes could occur to our one uncertain cost input: (i) its mean level could change, while leaving its uncertainty unaffected, or (ii) its mean level could remain unaffected while experiencing a change in the level of uncertainty surrounding it.
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Suppose, for example, that the firm experienced a sudden increase in the price of its variable input (e.g., from a sudden supply shock or transportation constraint).
Specifically, instead of facing an average cost of $13.92/unit, the new average cost became $16.92/unit. In this case, the uncertainty around that average price (the standard deviation of $2/unit) remains unchanged. Consequently, the impact on the firm's overall value is a parallel shift in the payoff probability profile. Although it is obvious that the firm is worse off as a result, it may be less obvious how each of the claimants is affected. Figure 8 illustrates the original and new payoff probability profiles.
[ Figure 8 here]
A change in the location of the sloped part of the profile (but not the slope itself) changes the default probability of the debt and changes the expected payoff to the equity holders while leaving their risk (variance) unchanged. This is a key observation, since in risk-adjusted terms, the equity holders are, in a sense, penalized twice (lower returns without lower risk). While the debt holders face a substantially increased risk of default 10 (21.2% versus 1.1% previously), the equity holders face both an increased probability of loss and a diminished up-side potential.
In contrast to the above example, suppose instead that the firm faced a change in the uncertainty surrounding the variable input, but not in the mean price level of its variable input (e.g., by exerting greater control over the supply chain producing its variable input). We will model this as a reduction in the standard deviation of the distribution of variable unit costs from $2/unit to $1/unit (with the mean unchanged at $13.92/unit). The general belief about the impact of such an event would be that the firm was better off -reducing risks is a good thing. While this is true in general, the real question to ask is "who is better off?" It may be possible, in many cases, for one class of stakeholders to be much better off while another class of stakeholders is made worse off.
Because of the relative sizes of their positions, however, the firm as a whole remains better off. Of course, the critical issue here involves agency and managerial discretion.
Unless bankruptcy occurs, management works for the equity holders. Any decisions made by management should be to maximize the value of the equity holders' claims (within any covenants imposed by the debt holders).
As this example will demonstrate, however, decisions that seem prudent (reducing the uncertainty surrounding the key variable cost) may not clearly support that objective. Figure 9 illustrates the original payoff profile, along with a new one reflecting the lower variance in variable input costs. Note that as the firm's value became more certain, the consequences were twofold: (i) the debt holders' position was strengthened by the reduction in default probability, and (ii) the equity holders' position was weakened by the reduction in upside opportunity. The second consequence is non-intuitive.
[ Figure 9 here] The reasoning behind this consequence makes clear the option-like role of equity.
Consider how our equity is defined as the capital remaining after satisfaction of the debt obligation. If we let E, D, and V represent, respectively, the values of the equity, debt, and the total firm, we can represent the equity payoff as [ ]
. But this is precisely the payoff function of a call option and volatility is the biggest driver of option values! If management acts to reduce the firm's volatility, they will also reduce the firm's option value, which belongs to the equity. Although there are often contracting and transaction cost arguments for reducing volatility, it is imperative that managers understand exactly how any change in the firm's uncertainty profile will affect not only overall firm values, but especially its relative influences on debt and equity. A wellintentioned manager, taking action to reduce volatility, may unintentionally benefit the debt at the expense of the equity by destroying option value.
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Finally, let us consider an asymmetric shift in the terminal payout probability profile. Our initial assumption that unit costs were distributed normally produced a symmetric distribution of project values. Equity holders would prefer instead that this distribution were skewed to the right, which is to say that up-side potential was enhanced without sacrificing the financial stability of the firm. Immediately, we realize that positive skewness is valuable; projects that promote up-side potential benefit the equity holders directly (even if variance is unchanged). More significantly for our purposes in this paper, however, is the observation that skewness is often invisible to conventional best case-base case-worst case assessments of projects because (i) such analysis gives insufficient attention to probabilities, and (ii) the representation of projects via only three stylized outcomes admits a virtual continuum of possible outcomes, all of which could share the same three points yet remain vastly different.
One common source of asymmetry in firm values is derived from management's ability to respond to negative events in a way that minimizes their impact (or, similarly, to respond to positive events in a way that maximizes their impact). This is precisely the claim of the widely-recognized real options literature (e.g., Amram and Kulatilaka [1999] ): flexibility has (option) value. For example, suppose we were to assume that instead of a single vendor (provider of the variable cost input), our firm had the flexibility to switch between two different vendors. We will assume that both vendors provide the firm with the same average unit cost (normally distributed with a mean of $13.92 and a standard deviation of $2), but that their prices need not be the same at the same time (i.e., on any given day, one of the vendors will charge a higher price). However, averaged over the entire year, their average prices are equal.
While our intuition may tell us that if average costs remain the same, the firm is no better off, we may also intuitively believe that the addition of flexibility somehow adds strategic value; the firm is now able to pay the lower of the two costs. Our simulation analysis enables us to precisely quantify that value -and analyze it as a function of our beliefs about how strongly the two vendors' prices are correlated (we are assuming a relatively strong 0.5 correlation for this example). The addition of this flexibility creates an option, and this option increases the value of the firm. 12 Most importantly, it increases the firm's value in a way that primarily benefits equity, but without negatively affecting debt. Figure 10 illustrates how this operating flexibility changes the distribution of the firm's operating margin by "skewing" the distribution toward more profitable outcomes.
As noted above, the increase in value is almost entirely captured by equity. Figure 11 once again illustrates our firm's capital structure diagram, now with the impact of this asymmetric shift in the terminal payout probability profile. While the position of the debt remains largely unchanged (there is a modest reduction in default probability), the equity clearly benefits both by an increase in the expected payoff, but also by an increase in the probability of obtaining higher payouts. In contrast to the mixed results of the reduction in variance example discussed earlier, the gains to equity here are unambiguous.
[ Figure 10 here]
[ Figure 11 here] Managers, as representatives of the equity holders, face the question "how should I act to maximize the value of the equity?" Consider the following two possible responses: (i) reduce risk, (ii) increase positive (reduce negative) skewness. It is tempting to reduce risk -and there are often compelling reasons for doing so. However, equity can often be most benefited by pursuing projects that introduce skewness into the payoff probability profile, such as those with real options components. Positive skewness increases equity up-side potential and therefore the option value of equity. The key, then,
is not to avoid all risks, but rather to have a thorough understanding of them. This understanding is virtually impossible with conventional forms of analysis, however, since they often lack the resolution required to observe valuation dynamics at the level of individual capital structure components. The simulation approach we outline here, however, not only precisely illustrates the possible outcomes to specific stakeholders, but also provides a powerful tool for "testing" managerial responses to uncertainties in the business environment.
UNCERTAINTY IN FIRM VALUE: RESTRUCTURING & CREDITOR CONTROL
In the previous section, we examined the impact of firm decision-making on capital structure when the firm was under the control of equity. As firms encounter financial distress and begin to violate debt covenants, and especially during a default event or bankruptcy, the equity holders lose their authority to operate the firm and the debt holders assume control. Clearly, there is a vast array of subtleties involved in such a transition that we will not address here. Our intent, instead, is to illustrate that simulation analysis can be used to examine the impact of these changes and reveal insights that would not be apparent under more traditional forms of analysis.
In contrast to the equity holders' objective, debt holders typically act to minimize the probability of default. Given a default event, they then act to maximize the recovery value of the firm. These new objectives change how the firm is operated and, as a result, can substantially influence firm and stakeholder values. For example, whereas in the previous section we saw that volatility was desirable for equity (because it increased the option value of equity), volatility is anathema to debt holders because it can only increase the likelihood of default. If, under the control of debt, however, a firm acts to minimize volatility (and thereby minimize default probabilities), it will result in a substantial (additional) diminution of value to equity holders.
To illustrate the ability of simulation analysis to capture and clarify these changes, in this section we will examine a typical scenario: the calculation of default probabilities and what the Basel standards would refer to as the loss in event of default (LIED) as a function of uncertain operational parameters (i.e., how does the LIED change as variable costs change). We will "create" financial distress for this example by lowering the unit revenue assumed in Table 1 from $50 to $45. Table 3 outlines this cash flow structureall other details remain unchanged from Table 1 . The average profit is now insufficient to pay the debt holders both principal and interest, which would constitute a technical default. While the firm has not yet actually defaulted, we will assume that creditor influence has increased (perhaps because debt covenants have been violated).
[ Table 3 here]
The first problem may simply be the determination of the default probability. The fact that the average outcome is default does not imply that default is inescapable. Figure   18 12 illustrates the probability profile of the capital structure under financial distress. Figure 13a and 13b illustrate this structure by individual component. It is trivial to see, as a result of the simulation, that the probability of default is 57.9% if we define default to include failure to pay the full interest due (even if principal is paid) and 48.4% if we define default to represent a failure to repay principal.
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[ Figure 12 here]
[ Figure 13a here]
[ Figure 13b here]
If, as these conditions suggest, default is probably imminent, questions may turn to calculation of expected recovery by the debt holders. This calculation is obviously related to the determination of LIED. In our simulation analysis, the equivalent question what is the default probability given that variable costs are above average (i.e., above $13.92/unit; one might think of this as the default probability in a "high cost" case, except with far greater precision in this analysis)? 96.9% of the time, when costs are above average, the firm will experience a default. From this information, it is now easy to see that controlling the variable cost uncertainty of the facility is critical under the financial distress scenario. As a result, the firm may wish to study the possibility of hedging their variable cost exposure. Suppose that the variable cost vendor was willing to guarantee a price within ±$1 of the average in return for a fixed fee. Given that the variable cost exposure was now "hedged" to be between $12.92 and $14.92 per unit, the expected recovery in a default scenario increases to $555,003 -an increase of $111,629 over the unhedged expected recovery. This amount puts a ceiling on the amount the debt would be willing to have the firm pay for such a guarantee. If the vendor offered the guarantee for $50,000, the debt holders could strengthen their position by accepting it.
However, in the above example, no mention was made of the value to equity.
With debt in control and the objective of the firm shifted to minimizing default probabilities and LIED, the equity can be significantly penalized. The hedging offer above is a way of limiting the volatility of the firm's value. Although this can be beneficial to the debt holders, any reduction in volatility reduces the option value of equity. From the equity's perspective, paying for such a loss in option value is merely adding insult to injury. Clearly, perspective matters, and simulation analysis can make explicit the bottom line impact of a change in operating perspective to each of the firm's stakeholders.
CONCLUSIONS
Simulation is an unparalleled tool for asking questions of the type: "what would happen if…?" It is sensitivity analysis in its most refined and powerful form. Simulation also reduces the degree to which unsupported conjectures drive asset values. By modeling uncertainty in asset or project values as emerging endogenously from the underlying fundamental uncertainties (e.g., variable costs or market prices) rather than being superimposed on the capital structure through assumptions about what constitutes "best case" and "worst case" scenarios, managers, lenders, and other stakeholders gain not only a clearer perspective on how the firm's value changes (both as a whole and within each class), but also gain a platform from which to communicate about such values.
In this paper, we have illustrated how simulation can be used by managers and investors to analyze potential opportunities and structure the firm's capital accordingly.
By incorporating the continuum of possible outcomes, as opposed to a select few, managers and investors are given a better perspective with which to make decisions. The ability to tie operational risks directly to impacts on capital structure provides a unifying mechanism for understanding firm value and provides insight into areas in which nonintuitive negative consequences may arise from well-intentioned actions. We have also illustrated how creditors can use simulation to inform decision making regarding the 21 division of firm value among claimants and how the impact of discretion granted to managers by creditors influences the value of claims.
Enormous advances in computing power and the widespread availability of offthe-shelf simulation software that can be used interactively within common spreadsheet packages mean that vast amounts of information can now be obtained quickly and costeffectively through the use of simulation modeling. Even simple implementations of simulation models can generate significant insight, providing an edge to savvy managers and investors in an environment characterized by ever-narrower margins and ever-greater risks.
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